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ABSTRACT 
 
Racial minorities are increasingly growing in the United States and the racial 
category “multiracial” is one of the fastest growing racial minorities. Racial 
essentialism is the belief that race has an underlying property and is innate 
and biological. Many people with essentialist beliefs do not normally 
categorize individuals with a multiracial background as multiracial. The current 
study assessed how an essentialism manipulation affects the neural 
processing of minority race targets by White participants. Participants 
completed a categorization task and passive task looking at ambiguous and 
monoracial faces while connect to EEG. For the passive task, results revealed 
gradient by race by condition interactions for the N170, P2, and N4 
components as well as race by gradient interactions for the P1, N2, P3, N3, 
and LPP components. Additionally, the category chosen for the target affected 
neural processing in the N3 component for the categorization condition. These 
findings demonstrate the need for continued research of the perception of 
multiracial individuals and continued attempts to reduce attentional bias. 
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Effects of an Essentialism Manipulation on the Neural Processing of Racial 
Minorities 
 The U.S. Census Bureau (2014) predicts that more than half of Americans 
will belong to a minority group by 2044 and that nearly one in five people in the 
entire U.S. population is projected to be foreign born by that year (Colby & 
Jennifer, 2014). The number of people who consider themselves as multiracial 
has also grown (Gathier, 2015) and has become one of the fastest growing U.S. 
population segments, increasing 32% in the last decade to about 9 million 
Americans (Humes, Jones, & Ramirez, 2011). With the growing population of 
racial minorities and mixed race individuals, it might seem that negative attitudes 
toward racial minorities will decrease in the coming years as different social 
groups interact more with one another. However, studies have suggested that 
the changing U.S. racial population can trigger “greater pro-White/anti-Black” 
minority sentiment in White individuals (Craig & Richeson, 2014, pg. 754; Outten, 
Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012). The population shift may be seen as a threat to 
majority White status and is coupled with a resistance towards that shift, 
increasing politically conservative viewpoints including changes in racial policies 
such as immigration (Craig & Richeson, 2014). Overall, these studies suggest 
that prejudice may be increasing among Whites with growing numbers of 
minorities (Craig & Richeson, 2014). As minorities continue to populate the U.S., 
studying the perceptions of racial minority and multiracial individuals is critical to 
reduce prejudice and improve relations among groups.  
Person Perception and Social Categorization 
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Social categorization is the process by which people are identified as 
members of a social group (e.g., race, sexual orientation) rather than seen as 
individuals (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Social categorization is 
thought to occur as a result of the complexity of the social world, as an attempt to 
simplify perception to conserve cognitive resources (Lippman, 1922). Since 
Lippman’s conceptualization of social categorization, studies have supported this 
explanation through demonstrating that social categorization is an energy-saving 
device that simplifies information processing (Allport, 1954; Anderson, Klatzky, & 
Murray, 1990; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Fiske & Neurberg, 1990; 
Tajfel, 1969) due to individuation being a time-consuming and cognitively-
draining exercise (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak, 
1986). Social categorization has been demonstrated to occur with many social 
groups (e.g., gender, age, race, and sexual orientation) but tends to happen 
more easily and more often in social groups that are easily visually identifiable, 
such as racial groups that are socially constructed in our society (Balcetis & 
Lassiter, 2010; Spears, Postmes, Lea, & Wolbert, 2002). Research shows that 
racial categorizations often occur within a few hundred milliseconds of viewing a 
face (e.g., Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Giner-Sorolla, García, & Bargh, 1999; Ito & 
Urland, 2003, 2005), suggesting that this is an implicit cognitive process. 
Because targets belong to multiple social categories (i.e., race, gender, 
age; Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Neumann & DeSchepper, 1992; Tipper, 1985), 
the “category salience, chronic accessibility, and goal relevance” determine 
which social category perceivers attribute to the target (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 
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1998, pg. 98). Gender and race tend to be the most salient social categories 
because they represent “fundamental divides of the natural world” which are 
believed by people to be biological and stable foundations (Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000, pg. 21). Once a social category is salient, learned 
expectancies are activated and can lead perceivers to make stereotype-based 
judgments of the target (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). Activation of stereotypes depends on factors such as 
perceiver’s temporary processing goals (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Macrae et al., 
1997; Spencer et al., 1998), their general prejudice levels toward members of the 
category (e.g., Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wittenbrink et al., 1997), and perceiver’s 
chronic beliefs about out group members (Lepore & Brown, 1997; Locke et al., 
1994; Wittenbrink et al., 1997), among many others (see Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000 for a review). Social categorization can therefore lead to 
stereotype activation about a social group which can lead quicker categorization 
of outgroup members (e.g., Levin, 1996; Kubota & Ito, 2007), implicit activation of 
stereotypes and negative appraisals of outgroup members (e.g. Fazio, Jackson, 
Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Wittenbrink et al., 2001), poorer memory for outgroup 
members (e.g., Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Levin, 2000), and negative perceptions 
of group members (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Additional 
consequences of this categorical thinking include discriminatory behavior, 
especially toward outgroups (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Correll, Park, Judd, 
& Wittenbrink, 2002; Jussim, Palumbo, Smith, & Madon, 2000; Payne, 2001).  
For instance, when White participants were primed with stereotypes about 
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Blacks, they tended to show more hostility toward experimenter requests than 
White participants who were not primed with those stereotypes (Bargh, Chen, & 
Burrows, 1996). Similarly, Correll and colleagues (2002) found that White 
participants playing a video game where they were told to shoot armed targets 
and to not shoot unarmed targets were quicker to shoot armed targets if the 
target was Black and were quicker to decide against shooting an un-armed target 
if the target was White. This bias was also shown among Black participants. 
These studies suggest that stereotype activation can lead to behaviors that can 
lead to potential harm. More research is needed to mitigate the activation of 
stereotypes and the resulting behaviors. 
Ambiguity and Categorization 
 Although much research has examined the social categorization of 
monoracial targets, there is less research on the social categorization of 
multiracial targets (Freeman, Pauker, Apfelbaum, & Ambady, 2010). Being 
multiracial refers to having multiple racial identities (Hamilton & Chen, 2012). 
Though the category of multiracial individuals is growing, many people who have 
a background including more than one race still tend to identify as monoracial 
(Pew, 2015). For example, Halle Berry was the first Black woman to win an 
Academy Award for Best Actress and identifies as Black though her ancestry 
would make her multiracial (she has a White mother and Black father; Hamilton & 
Chen, 2012). However, race is a continuum where most individuals are 
multiracial (Bodenhausen, 2010; Chakravarti, 2009). Multiracial individuals are 
often referred to as “ambiguous” to perceivers because they do not “fit” into 
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predefined racial categories and are often difficult to categorize by these 
perceivers (Chen & Hamilton, 2012). In this paper, the multiracial label will be 
used most often to refer to groups of people who identify as multiracial or have 
multiracial backgrounds. In contrast, the ambiguous label will be used when 
talking about studies conducted using faces because much of the time, 
“ambiguous” faces are digitally “morphed” from two parent faces (e.g., Black and 
White parents) using software rather than being naturally multiracial. 
 One common theory to explain how people categorize multiracial 
individuals (especially Black-White multiracial) is hypodescent or a categorization 
system where anyone who has mixed racial ancestry is classified as the “socially 
subordinate race” (Ho, Sidanius, Levin, & Banaji, 2011; Peery & Bodenhausen, 
2008). The most common application of this in the US is the “one-drop rule” in 
which historically people tend to categorize anybody with “one drop” of “Black 
blood” as Black. This “one-drop rule” came about in the US as part of institutional 
racism, even after slavery had ended. That is, categorizing anyone with a Black 
ancestor as Black denied that person the rights of White individuals and allowed 
for individuals to be subjected to the severe legal and social discrimination that 
their ancestors went through (Ho et al., 2011). This is coupled with the underlying 
historic assumption that Black individuals are subordinate to White individuals 
(Lewis, 2016). Many studies have found support for this theory (e.g., Ho et al., 
2011; Peery & Bodenhausen, 2008) where White participants will often classify 
multiracial faces as Black. Peery and Bodenhausen (2008) and Ho and 
colleagues (2011) used similar paradigms whereby White participants were 
 6 
 
shown ambiguous target faces that were accompanied by profiles that either 
labeled one or two grandparents as White (Ho et al., 2011) or profiles about the 
target’s parents race (Peery & Bodenhausen, 2008). Both sets of researchers 
had participants complete a speeded categorization task after viewing the target 
images and profiles where they were asked to categorize the target as either 
White/non-White and Black/non-Black (Peery & Bodenhausen, 2008) or as 
White, Black, or mixed race (Ho et al., 2011). Both sets of researchers found that 
participants were quicker and more likely to categorize the multiracial faces as 
Black, especially if they were said to have any amount of Black ancestry.  
Another popular theory attempting to explain these findings is the in-group 
overexclusion effect which predicts the same results for White participants as 
hypodescent does. This theory states that people are motivated to protect their 
in-group from outside members and thus exclude multiracial targets from their in-
group (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992). In support of this theory, Castano and 
colleagues (2002) showed that people who identified more strongly with their 
ingroup were more likely than those who identified more weakly to show the 
overexclusion effect. These theories both suggest that the categorization of 
multiracial individuals is rooted in institutional racism in our society. 
Multiple studies have suggested that external contextual factors can 
influence the categorization of racially ambiguous individuals (Ito et al., 2011; 
Lewis, 2016; Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2008). Lewis (2016) found that the 
perceiver’s racial experiences mattered when categorizing mixed-race targets 
such that perceivers with greater experience with White faces categorized mixed-
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race faces as Black more often than White while perceivers with greater 
experience with Black faces categorized mixed-race faces as White more often 
than Black. This suggests that the perceivers’ familiarity with racial categories 
influence categorization of target faces and also that racial categorization is an 
individual attribute.  
 Another factor that has been shown to influence the social categorization 
of multiracial individuals in this research is the racial labels provided to 
participants. Most research has focused on categorizing multiracial individuals as 
either Black/non-Black or White/non-White (e.g., Lewis, 2016; Peery & 
Bodenhausen, 2008) or has had participants choose between either a Black or 
White categorization (e.g., Krosch & Amodio, 2014; Rodeheffer, Hill, & Lord, 
2012). In most of these studies, “Black” categories are used much more often to 
classify racially ambiguous target faces than are other categories. However, 
when participants are asked to verbally assign a category to a multiracial target, 
multiracial labels are barely used at all and often “other” races such as Hispanic 
and Middle Eastern serve to categorize ambiguous images (Nicolas, Skinner, & 
Dickter, under review). The results of the article by Nicolas, Skinner, and Dickter 
suggest that White individuals prefer categorizing multiracial targets using 
discrete racial categories (i.e., putting targets into already made categories) 
instead of viewing race as a continuum (but see Chen & Hamilton, 2012).  
Context can also play a role in categorization (e.g., Ito et al., 2011; 
Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2008). For instance, Ito and colleagues (2011) found that 
racially-ambiguous faces were perceived as more prototypically Black and less 
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prototypically White when presented with only ambiguous and White faces but 
that the opposite was true when presented with only ambiguous and Black faces. 
Similarly, Willadsen-Jensen and Ito (2008) found that Asian perceivers neurally 
processed Asian and racially ambiguous faces more deeply when shown many 
Asian faces but processed White and racially ambiguous faces more deeply 
when showed many White faces. Taken together, this research demonstrates 
that context appears to be a factor in how perceivers categorize multiracial 
individuals, along with familiarity and known racial categories. Therefore, 
categorizing multiracial target faces is more complex and possibly based more 
on the perceiver than categorization of monoracial target faces. 
Person Perception and Attention 
 One of the cognitive processes associated with racial categorization is 
implicit attention. Research has shown that level of implicit attention allocated to 
a particular target is associated with social categorization as well as how targets 
are perceived (e.g., Bettencourt, Dill, Greathouse, Charlton, & Mulholland, 1997; 
Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Dickter & Gyurovski, 2012). Some researchers have 
found that perceivers demonstrate differential attention to outgroup relative to 
ingroup members using implicit behavioral tasks such as the Dot Probe task 
(Brosch & Van Bavel, 2012; Trawalter, Todd, Baird, & Richeson, 2008), whereas 
others have not found a difference in attention between these groups (Dickter, 
Gagnon, Gyurovski, & Brewington, 2015; Donders, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2008). 
During the Dot Probe task, participants are shown a fixation cross in the middle 
of the screen and then a picture on either side that are part of the social group in 
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which the researchers are interested. For example, in studies that use Black and 
White target faces, one side of the screen will have a picture of a Black target 
face while the other side will have a picture of a White target face. The faces are 
replaced by a dot on one side of the screen and participants are instructed to 
press a button corresponding to the side of the screen the dot was shown. This 
task is thought to measure implicit attention by measuring participants’ reaction 
times with the idea that it will take longer to press the button if the dot appears 
behind the picture that participants’ attention is not on. 
Reaction time based measures such as the Dot Probe are limited when 
investigating the cognitive processing of social groups as they are dependent on 
the speed of motor processes and task requirements (Ito & Cacioppo, 2000) and 
may be affected by cognitive control processes such as social presentation 
(Sternberg, 2010). Therefore, recent studies have turned toward using 
psychophysiological measures which can show us the underlying neural events 
that are occurring during the social categorization process. Event-related brain 
potentials (ERPs) have a high temporal resolution so they provide an ideal 
measure of implicit attention during social categorization. Unlike reaction time 
based measures, ERPs are also independent of cognitive control processes and 
thus participants cannot control these implicit responses (Ito, Thompson, & 
Cacioppo, 2004). ERPs are epochs from EEG that are time-locked to repeated 
stimulus presentation (Bartholow & Dickter, 2011) and are the result of a specific 
cognitive, sensory, or motor event (Luck, 2012). There are multiple ERP 
components that each represent different cognitive processes, including implicit 
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attention. 
 The P1 component is a positive component that typically peaks around 
100 ms and is usually the first component elicited by visual stimuli (Luck, 2005). 
It has been assumed to reflect early visual processing and may be moderated by 
attention (Luck, 2005; Wiese et al., 2009). Due to its connection with visual 
stimuli and attention, the P1 component is a component of interest to examine 
implicit processing during racial categorization. 
 The N170 component is one that is particularly sensitive to faces (e.g., 
Eimer, 2000; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chen, 1997) and is a negative 
component that peaks around 170 ms. It has also been suggested as playing a 
role in the identification of social category information in faces (Freeman, 
Ambady, & Holcomb, 2010). This component is of theoretical interest because it 
has been associated with the differential processing of own-race and other-race 
faces and is usually found to be larger to ingroup faces (Caldara et al., 2003; 
Herrmann et al., 2007; Ito & Urland, 2005; Walker, Silvert, Hewstone, & Nobre, 
2008; Wiese et al., 2009). 
 The P2 component is positive and usually peaks around 200 ms post-
stimulus. A larger P2 amplitude is thought to reflect greater attention to a 
stimulus (Hillyard & Munte, 1984; Luck & Hillyard, 1994; Ritter, Simson, & 
Vaughan, 1983; Wijers, Mulder, Okita, Mulder, & Scheffers, 1989). One of the 
most consistent findings in ERP research with faces is that the P2 component is 
larger to racial outgroup than ingroup faces (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Ito & 
Urland, 2003, 2005; Kubota & Ito, 2007; Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2006, 2008). 
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 The N2 component is a negative component that peaks around 200-400 
ms after the stimulus and is sensitive to social group membership (Luck, 2005). 
Another of the most consistent findings in ERP research looking at target faces is 
that the N2 is larger to racial ingroup than outgroup faces (e.g., Dickter & 
Bartholow, 2007; Ito, Thompson, & Cacioppo, 2004; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; 
Kubota & Ito, 2007; Walker, Silvert, Hewstone, & Nobre, 2008; Willadsen-Jensen 
& Ito, 2006, 2008). 
 The P3 component typically peaks around 250-500ms and is typically 
associated with novelty (Friedman, Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001) where the 
amplitude usually increases when the likelihood of the event decreases (e.g., 
Donchin & Coles, 1988; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Squires et al., 1975). 
Studies have also found that people have better memory for stimuli which elicit 
larger amplitudes (e.g., Donchin, 1981; Donchin & Coles, 1988; Friedman & 
Johnson, 2000). In previous studies, this component has been shown to be due 
to the novelty of faces based on race. 
 Finally, the LPP component usually is usually initiated around 400 ms and 
is larger following the presentation of racial ingroup than outgroup faces (Ito & 
Urland, 2003; Wiese et al., 2009). 
Taken together, ERP research examining the categorization of social 
groups has demonstrated that early attention is directed differentially to in-group 
and out-group members though much of this research has focused on attention 
to monoracial targets (e.g., Bartholow & Dickter, 2008; Dickter & Bartholow, 
2007; Ito & Bartholow, 2009; Ito et al., 2004; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005), most 
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consistently demonstrating that the P2 and N2 components differentiate between 
Black and White faces (Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2006, 
2008; Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Kubota & Ito, 2007).  
Essentialist Thinking 
Studies have suggested that many different factors influence racial 
categorization, ranging from group identification (e.g., Castano, Yzerbyt, 
Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002), stereotypes and affective orientations (e.g., Richeson 
& Trawalter, 2005), prejudicial attitudes (e.g., Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004), 
political ideologies and affiliations (e.g., Caruso, Mead, & Balcetis, 2009), as well 
as beliefs about the underlying nature of race (Eberhardt, Dasgupta, & 
Banaszynski, 2003; Plaks et al., 2012). Beliefs about the nature of race are 
particularly interesting because they can be manipulated more easily than 
stereotypes or political ideologies can. Also, research has consistently shown 
that people tend to allocate more attention and resources to people they perceive 
as kin (e.g., Hamilton, 1964; Kruger, 2003; O’Gorman, Wilson, & Miller, 2005), so 
people who believe that race is biological in nature may be less likely to direct 
attention/resources to outgroup members (Williams & Eberhardt, 2008).  
Most researchers will argue that race is socially constructed and research 
has supported this view. For example, Zuckerman (1990) found that there are 
many more genetic differences within traditionally defined racial groups than 
between them. In addition, a study found that unemployed, incarcerated or 
impoverished people were more likely to both be categorized as black and self-
identify as black, without regard to how they were categorized previously, 
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suggesting race as malleable instead of fixed (Penner & Saperstein, 2008). 
These researchers also found that race can change over time according to 
perceivers and individuals as well as change in response to social position 
(Saperstein & Penner, 2012). Additionally, cues regarding status can affect the 
racial category to which individuals are assigned (Freeman, Penner, Saperstein, 
Scheutz, & Ambady, 2011; Penner & Saperstein, 2008). When people are told 
that a woman receives welfare payments, they are more likely to categorize her 
as Black rather than White (Penner & Saperstein, 2013). 
Though many researchers argue that race is a socially constructed 
category, many people often treat this category as naturally existing (Markus, 
2008). People often assume that race is set in stone, immutable, and biologically 
based with attributed meaning to the categorization based on the outward visual 
characteristic of different racial groups (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). This is the 
basis of essentialist thinking. Gaither and colleagues (2014, pg. 2) state that 
racial essentialism is composed of many components including social, cultural, 
and cognitive that “impact perception, mental representation, and judgement”. 
This thinking seems to be grounded in the belief that the categories have 
underlying essences that define their nature (Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony, 
1989). 
 Psychological essentialism is the belief that members of a group share 
“essences” that grant them their categorical identity (Gelman, 2003; Haslam, 
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Prentice & Miller, 2007). These categories are seen as 
discrete because traditionally a person can either have an “essence” or not 
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(Dennett & Mittwoch, 1995). Race is one of the most essentialized social groups 
because there is a highly visual component that people can hone in on, believing 
that we can easily categorize a person based on their race (Haslam et al., 2000; 
Prentice & Miller, 2007). Essentialism therefore promotes racial categories as 
objective and natural and exaggerates differences between groups while down-
playing differences within groups (e.g., Freeman et al., 2010; Maddox & Gray, 
2002). However, there are many variations and ambiguities within race that are 
not accounted for by essentializing groups (Gaither et al., 2014). Psychological 
essentialism affects how people observe categories and members within that 
category and can affect how likely people are to bridge category divides (Prentice 
& Miller, 2007).  
Essentialist Thinking and Ambiguity. Essentialist thinking will be 
especially important when a member of a group is not easily categorized into pre-
existing groups, such as ambiguous or mixed-race individuals (Pauker, Rule, & 
Ambady, 2010). Indeed, people are slower to make categorization decisions 
when the target person cannot be easily identified by race, creating uncertainty 
(see Chen & Hamilton, 2012). Additionally, priming essentialist beliefs makes 
people less likely to use a multiracial categorization for ambiguous-raced 
individuals (Chen & Hamilton, 2012). 
Additionally, people who endorse racial essentialism are more likely to 
endorse hypodescent and are more likely to categorize ambiguous-raced 
individuals as belonging to the subordinate social group (Chao, Hong, & Chiu, 
2013). Essentialist thinking also predicts reliance on monoracial and discrete 
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labels when processing and trying to remember racially ambiguous faces 
(Eberhardt et al., 2003; Pauker & Ambady, 2009). Finally, biracial adults are less 
likely to endorse essentialist thinking than their monoracial counterparts (Bonam 
& Shih, 2009; Pauker & Ambady, 2009; Shih, Bonam, Sanchez, & Peck 2007). 
Consequences of Essentialist Thinking. People who hold essentialist 
conceptions of race are more likely to endorse racial stereotypes (Bastian & 
Haslam, 2006; Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004; Haslam et al., 2000; Haslam, Bastian, 
Bain, & Kashima, 2006; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998; Plaks, Stroessner, 
Dweck, & Sherman, 2001; Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001), misremember 
minority group members in stereotypical ways (Eberhardt et al., 2003), act in 
prejudicial ways (Condit, Parrott, Bates, Bevan, & Achter, 2004; Jayaratne et al., 
2006; Keller, 2005) and show less concern for, and interest in, interacting with 
racial outgroup members (Keller, 2005; Verkuyten, 2003; Williams & Eberhardt, 
2008). Similarly, Williams and Eberhardt (2008) found that individuals who 
endorsed a biological conception of race were more likely to endorse African 
American stereotypes than were individuals who endorse a social conception of 
race. Leyens and colleagues (2000, 2003) also found that essentialist beliefs 
were associated with a propensity to view outgroups as less likely to experience 
uniquely human emotions and therefore as not completely human. 
 There are various ways to reduce racial essentialism in White individuals. 
Young, Sanchez, and Wilton (2013) found that labeling racially ambiguous 
images as biracial led a reduction of essentialist beliefs in individuals while 
labeling racially ambiguous images as monoracial led to an increase of 
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essentialist beliefs. A series of studies conducted by Sanchez, Young, and 
Pauker (2015) showed that being exposed to racial ambiguity and interacting 
with a racially ambiguous individual led to a reduction in biological lay theories. 
This effect lasted for two weeks. Williams and Eberhardt (2008) also conducted a 
series of studies where participants were primed via a news article of a biological 
or social-constructivist view of race. When primed with a biological view of race, 
participants were more likely to accept racial injustices and less likely to want to 
interact with an outgroup member. 
Current Research 
 Taken together, previous research suggests that holding essentialist 
beliefs about race can lead to paying greater attention to minority members and 
being faster in categorizing minority targets which may in turn lead to later 
prejudicial behavior. The current research was conducted to examine whether 
manipulating essentialist beliefs influences the neural processing of multiracial 
and monoracial minorities. This study expands on the current literature where 
essentialism has been manipulated only in behavioral studies (e.g., Williams & 
Eberhardt, 2008; Ho et al., 2015) and where researchers have mostly looked at 
monoracial faces following an essentialism manipulation (e.g., Williams & 
Eberhardt, 2008). Examining the implicit processing of multiracial faces at the 
neural level will aid in our understanding of the timecourse of the cognitive 
processes resulting from viewing multiracial individuals, which could have 
implications for social categorization and stereotype activation. In addition, 
examining ways to change this processing can help us further understand the 
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contextual factors influencing these cognitive processes which is especially 
important as the multiracial population in the US grows.  
 In this study, participants were given an essentialism manipulation where 
they read an article that claimed that race is either biological or social in nature, 
or were given an article that had nothing to do with race (i.e., control). After 
reading the article, participants completed a task where they viewed White/Black 
monoracial and multiracial faces and categorized the faces as “Black”, “White”, 
“Mixed Race”, or “Other Race” and also completed a passive viewing task where 
no response was necessary. 
Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1: The essentialism manipulation will influence people’s 
previously held essentialist beliefs. People who read an article suggesting that 
race is socially constructed will have decreased post-test essentialism scores 
whereas people who read an article suggesting that race is biologically 
constructed will have increased post-test essentialist beliefs scores and people 
who read the control article will not change in their essentialist beliefs. However, 
we expect that the people whose scores will change the most are those in the 
middle-low to middle-high range in essentialism scores as people who are 
extremely high or low many not be influenced by reading one article in a lab 
setting. We expect that participant race will not play a role here. 
Hypothesis 2: Participants will be quicker to categorize monoracial 
versus multiracial faces. Participants will categorize monoracial target faces 
more quickly relative to morphed, multiracial faces (e.g., Levin, 2000; Peery & 
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Bodenhausen, 2008; Stroessner, 1996). Non-White participants will show similar 
effects. 
 Hypothesis 3: White participants will have differential neural 
attention for outgroup and ambiguous targets compared to White targets. 
Larger ERP amplitudes are associated with greater neural attention so we expect 
to replicate previous literature in which participants will have greater amplitudes 
toward racial minority targets than White targets. We will investigate the P1, 
N170, P2, N2, P3, and LPP components. We expect the positive components 
(i.e., P1, P2, P3, LPP) to show greater attention toward outgroup rather than 
ingroup faces. For White participants, that means that participants will have 
higher amplitudes toward Black/ambiguous faces than White faces whereas non-
White participants will have similar amplitudes across target race. We expect the 
negative components (i.e., N170 and N2) to show greater attention toward 
ingroup rather than outgroup faces. For White participants then we expect higher 
amplitudes in the negative components to White target faces as opposed to 
Black/ambiguous target faces because previous research has demonstrated this 
effect (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Kubota & Ito, 2007; 
Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2006, 2008). Again, we expect non-White participants to 
have similar amplitudes across target race. We expect the negative components 
(i.e., N170 and N2) to have greater amplitudes toward ingroup rather than 
outgroup faces. For White participants, we expect higher amplitudes in the 
negative components to White target faces as opposed to Black/ambiguous 
target faces. Again, we expect non-White participants to have similar amplitudes 
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across target race. 
 Hypothesis 4: Participants in the social constructivist condition will 
have less neural attention for Black and ambiguous targets compared to 
participants in the biological condition while the control condition will be 
somewhere between. Participants who read an article stating that race is 
socially constructed will have ERP amplitudes that are not significantly different 
between Black, ambiguous, or White targets while participants who read that 
race is biological will have more extreme ERP amplitudes toward Black and 
ambiguous targets compared to the White targets. We expect this to occur in the 
positive components.  
 Hypothesis 5: Participants who use more mixed race labels for faces 
will have less neural attention for Black and ambiguous targets. Participants 
who are more likely to use the “mixed” race label for faces will have lower 
amplitudes toward racial minorities (both monoracial and ambiguous) than will 
their counterparts who choose mostly monoracial or “other” race for target faces. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 74 undergraduates (55% female) who were enrolled in 
an Introductory Psychology course at a medium-sized public liberal arts college. 
All the participants were between 18 and 22 years of age, with a mean age of 
19.14 (SD = 1.02) years. Participants were 66% White, 7% Black, 18% 
Asian/Pacific Islander, 5% Native American, 16% Hispanic/Latino, and 2% other. 
All participants were right-handed and reported no previous head trauma. All 
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procedures were approved by the college’s Protection of Human Subjects 
Committee, and written informed and debriefing consent was obtained from each 
participant. Participants received partial course credit for participating. 
Materials 
 Picture stimuli. Pictures were taken from the NimStim database 
(Tottenham et al., 2009) which included pictures of various races and has been 
used previously in ERP studies (e.g., He, Johnson, Dovidio, & McCarthy, 2009; 
Smith, Weinberg, Moran, & Hajcak, 2013). The pictures that we included were 
Black and White parent faces which were morphed using Morpheus to create 
intermediate categories of 25%, 50%, and 75% Black, see Appendix A. The 
pictures were shown in color in order to increase external validity (Stepanova & 
Strube, 2009). All pictures were cropped so that just their face was showing. We 
included only 5 levels of Black-to-White phenotypicality: 0% Black/100% White, 
25% Black/75% White, 50% Black/50% White, 75% Black/25% White, and 100% 
Black/0% White. These faces were piloted and matched on attractiveness. Four 
pictures were chosen from each of the five categories of phenotypicality for both 
males and females, creating ten categories, five from each gender. These photos 
were piloted then tested using a 5 x 2 x 4 (Phenotypicality x Sex x Individual 
Target) ANOVA for attractiveness which revealed no main effects or interactions, 
all ps > .100. 
Picture viewing tasks. Participants completed the following tasks while 
connected to the computer via an amplifier to record EEG.  
Passive task. Participants completed a passive picture-viewing task 
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designed to assess implicit levels of attention toward racial minorities. 
Participants were told that no response was necessary and that they were to just 
watch the pictures carefully as they would be tested on them later. Pictures were 
each shown for 1000 ms and the ITI ranged from between 1000 ms to 2000 ms. 
Categorization task. Participants also completed a categorization task in 
which they were asked to classify the images into one of four categories: Black, 
White, mixed race, or other. These categories were counterbalanced across 
participants. Participants first completed a practice trial consisting of 5 images 
before completing the actual trial. Participants used their right hand on the 
number keys 1, 3, 5, and 7 to categorize the faces. On the computer screen, 
participants were told to categorize the faces as “White”, “Black”, “Mixed Race”, 
or “Other Race” but labels above the numbers on the keyboard were labeled 
“White”, “Black”, “Mixed”, “Other”. Target faces were each presented until 
participants pressed a button or no longer than 2000 ms and the ITI between 
pictures ranged from between 1000 ms to 2000 ms. 
Questionnaires. In addition to completing a demographic questionnaire in 
which participants indicated their age, gender, race/ethnicity, and what year in 
college they are currently in, they also completed the following questionnaires to 
assess explicit attitudes toward racial groups as well as their familiarity with racial 
minorities. 
Race conceptions scale (RCS; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). The RCS 
was used to assess racial essentialism or a physical conception of race, see 
Appendix B. This scale consists of 10 items. Participants reported the degree to 
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which they agreed with statements such as “I believe physical features determine 
race” and “The same racial categories have pretty much always existed” using a 
7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). This scale has 
been shown to have adequate internal consistency (α = .79-.93). Responses 
were reverse-coded where necessary and averaged, with higher scores 
indicating a more physical conception of race. 
Attitudes toward Blacks measure (ATB; Brigham, 1993). The ATB was 
used to assess attitudes toward Black individuals and consists of 20 items, see 
Appendix C. Participants rated their level of agreement for items such as “Some 
Blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them” and 
“Generally, Blacks are not as smart as Whites” on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The appropriate items were reverse-
coded and individual items were averaged to form a composite score with higher 
scores indicating a more positive attitude toward Blacks. 
Familiarity with racial minorities. To assess close contact with racial 
minority group members, participants provided the initials of up to 20 close 
friends and then subsequently identified the race of those individuals. This 
measure was previously used to covertly identify close friendships with 
individuals of different social groups (Dickter et al., 2015; Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998). 
Essentialism Manipulation. Participants were assigned one of three 
articles to read taken from Williams and Eberhardt (2008), see Appendix D. One 
third of the participants read an article meant to prime a biological view of race 
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entitled “Scientists Pinpoint Genetic Underpinnings of Race” where a quote said 
that it is possible to “correctly guess the patients’ racial backgrounds 69% of the 
time, which is well above chance rate” from a melanin gene. Another third of the 
participants read an article meant to prime a social-constructivist view of race 
entitled “Scientists Reveal That Race Has No Genetic Basis” where a quote 
indicates that it is possible to “correctly guess the patients’ racial backgrounds 
only 27% of the time, which is really no better than chance” from a melanin gene. 
Finally, the rest of the participants read a control article that was not related to 
race entitled “Scientists Discover Galaxy With Gas Halo” which was comparable 
in difficulty and readability to the experimental articles (Williams & Eberhardt, 
2008).  
Procedure 
The experiment was completed in three parts. In the first part, all students 
who were enrolled in an Introduction to Psychology course completed the RCS in 
a mass testing questionnaire that included questions from all different areas of 
psychology. Participants were then recruited based on their scores (most with 
mid-range to high scores on the RCS) to participate in the next parts of the study. 
We recruited these participants because we were trying to reduce essentialist 
beliefs and felt that these participants would be most likely to believe in the 
manipulation, thereby changing their views. Participants who were recruited had 
mean scores ranging from 3.82 to 6.32 (M = 4.36; SD = 0.48) and were sent an 
email inviting them to participate in the next two parts of the study. 
Participants completed the second part of the study online on their own 
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time, completing the RCS, the ATB scale, and some demographic questions, 
along with the following filler questionnaires that will not be analyzed in the 
current study: Current Mood Assessment (Sechrist, Swim, & Mark, 2003) and the 
Big Five Personality Trait Short Questionnaire (Morizot, 2014). The mood and 
personality questionnaires were included so that all questions being asked were 
not about race and therefore the purpose of the study was not as obvious. These 
RCS scores were used as a pre-test measure of essentialism, before they 
completed the manipulation. 
For the main study, the third part, testing was conducted with one 
participant at a time. Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants completed an 
informed consent form and the EEG procedure was explained. The electrode cap 
was then placed on the participant’s head and electrodes were tested to assure 
low impedances. Participants sat 70 cm from the computer screen and were 
instructed to stay as still as possible during the trials in order to reduce noise in 
the EEG data.  
Participants were given the essentialism article to read and told that 
because they would be tested later, they should read through it carefully. 
Participants let the experimenter know when they had finished reading then 
followed the instructions presented on the computer screen. Participants then 
completed the experimental blocks while the EEG data were recorded and the 
article was given again in between the two tasks. All tasks were counterbalanced 
across participants. In each of the tasks, participants completed a total of 400 
trials (4 from each of the 10 categories that were each presented 10 times). 
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Participants then completed the experimental blocks while the EEG data were 
recorded and the article was given again in between the two tasks. After 
completing all tasks, the electrode cap was removed and participants completed 
the self-report measures on the computer, including the RCS again which was 
used as post-test essentialism scores. When participants were finished with the 
online questionnaire they were debriefed and signed a debriefing form. 
Participants were then thanked and dismissed. 
Electrophysiological Recording and Analysis 
EEG data were recorded using BrainVision Recorder software 
(BrainVision LLC, Morrisville, NC). The EEG data were recorded from 32 Ag-
AgCl sintered electrodes in an electrode cap, placed using the expanded 
International 10-20 electrode placement system. All electrodes were referenced 
to an electrode placed in the middle of the head, and the ground electrode was 
placed in the middle of the forehead. Eye movement and blinking were recorded 
from electrodes placed on the lateral canthi and peri-occular electrodes on the 
superior and inferior orbits, aligned with the pupils. Before data collection was 
initiated, all impedances were adjusted to within 0-20 kΩ.  
Following data collection, the EEG data were analyzed using BrainVision 
Analyzer software (BrainVision LLC, Morrisville, NC). Eye movement artifacts in 
the data were corrected, using either ocular correction or ocular ICA correction 
based on how noisy the continuous data were (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983). 
All EEG data were filtered at low pass .01 Hz and at high pass 30 Hz. 
Segmentation 200 ms prior to stimulus onset and 1000 ms post-stimulus onset 
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was performed. After baseline correction over the pre-stimulus interval, 
segmented data were averaged for each participant in each of the conditions. 
Analysis Strategy 
 For our analyses we first conducted a 2 (Time: Pre-Test, Post-Test) x 3 
(Condition: Social, Biological, Control) x 2 (Race: White, Non-White) mixed 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test our first hypothesis that the 
essentialism manipulation influenced people’s previously held essentialist beliefs. 
We included race as a between subjects’ factor because White participants 
would be viewing ingroup faces while non-White participants who are not Black 
would not be looking at any ingroup faces and previous research has found a 
difference in the way people process outgroup versus ingroup faces (Lewis, 
2016).  
Next, a 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black, 25% Black, 
50% Black, 75% Black, 100% Black) x 3 (Condition: Bio, Social, Control) mixed 
measures ANOVA was performed on the reaction times and ERP amplitudes of 
the participants separately for the passive viewing task and the categorization 
task, testing hypotheses three and four. The analyses conducted for the ERP 
components of interest were conducted at electrode clusters that were chosen 
based on previous research of the electrodes each component measures. P1, 
P2, P3, LPP, N170, and N2 were chosen because of theoretical interest and 
because they were identified using the BrainVision Analyzer software 
(BrainVision LLC, Morrisville, NC). N3 and N4 were chosen because they were 
clearly identified as components using the software based on how prominent 
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these components were for participants. We identified P1 at electrode cluster Pz, 
P3, and P4 between 75 ms and 150 ms. N170 was identified between 120 ms 
and 200 ms and at electrode cluster T8, TP10, and P8. P2 was identified at 
electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4 between 175 ms and 250 ms. N2 was identified 
at electrode cluster Fz, F3, and F4 between 175 ms and 220 ms. N3 was 
identified between 250 ms and 320 ms at electrode cluster Cz, C3, and C4. P3 
was identified at electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4 between 250 ms and 350 ms. 
N4 was identified between 340 ms and 420 ms at electrode cluster O1, O2, and 
Pz. LPP was identified at electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4 between 350 ms and 
800 ms. 
Finally, we report multiple behavioral results. Only significant or marginally 
significant results are reported except in the case of essentialist beliefs (our 
manipulation check) and ERP components. 
Results 
 Participant Characteristics 
 Of the 74 participants, one was excluded from analyses due to an EEG 
malfunction, two were excluded because they had heard about the study from 
others who had participated, one was excluded because they correctly guessed 
the purpose of the study, three were excluded because they did not believe the 
article, two were excluded for having a reaction time that was below 3 SD from 
the mean (n = 1) or above 3 SD from the mean (n = 1), and 12 additional 
participants were excluded who indicated that they were either Black or 
multiracial. The remaining 53 participants (28 males) were between the ages of 
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18 and 22 years old (M = 19.2, SE = .15), and 67.9% reported their race as 
White, 17.0% Asian, 11.3% Hispanic, 1.9% Native American, and 1.9% Other. 
There were 14 participants in the biological condition (9 White, 5 non-White), 18 
in the social condition (11 White, 7 non-White), and 21 in the control condition 
(16 White, 5 non-White). As demonstrated in Table 1, these groups did not differ 
in age, gender, race, percentage of Black friends, essentialism scores, or 
attitudes toward Blacks scores before the study. 
Manipulation Check – Hypothesis 1 
 There was a marginally significant three way interaction, F(2,39) = 2.873, 
p = .069, ηp2 = .128, see Figures 1a-1c. For Non-White participants in the social 
condition, post-test essentialism scores (M = 4.86, SE = .20) were significantly 
higher than were pre-test essentialism scores (M = 3.75, SE = .25), F(1,6) = 
22.288, p = .003, ηp2 = .788. All other ps > .185. 
Categorization Reaction Time 
 A 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black, 25% Black, 50% 
Black, 75% Black, 100% Black) x 3 (Condition: Biological, Social, Control) 
ANOVA was performed on the reaction times of the participants during the 
categorization task. There was a main effect of gradient on participant’s reaction 
times, F(4,204) = 51.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .502. This was qualified by a significant 
interaction of participant race and target gradient, F(4,204) = 3.54, p = .008, ηp2 = 
.065, see Figure 2. Simple main effects revealed a significant main effect of 
gradient for White participants, F(4,140) = 48.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .579 and a 
significant main effect for Non-White participants F(4,64) = 18.19, p < .001, ηp2 = 
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.532.  
Pairwise comparisons for White participants further revealed a significant 
difference between reaction times for 0% Black (fully White) target faces 
compared to 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% Black target faces, all ps < .001, where 
White participants were faster in categorizing 0% Black target faces. White 
participants were also marginally faster to categorize 25% versus 50% Black 
target faces, p = .068, but were significantly slower to categorize 50% target 
faces than any other groups, all ps < .001. Non-White participants were also 
significantly faster at categorizing 0% Black target faces compared to 25%, 50%, 
and 75% Black faces, all ps < .001, but did not significantly differ in reaction time 
of 0% and 100% Black target faces. Non-White participants were also 
significantly slower to categorize 25% target faces compared to 75% target face, 
p = .028, and the 100% Black target faces, p = .011, and were significantly 
slower to categorize 50% target faces to 75% or 100% target faces. Finally, non-
White participants did not significantly differ in reaction times to 75% and 100% 
Black target faces. 
Psychophysiological Results (Passive Task) 
 A 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black, 25% Black, 50% 
Black, 75% Black, 100% Black) x 3 (Condition: Bio, Social, Control) mixed 
measures ANOVA was conducted for each of the ERP components of interest. 
The ERPs used in this section are from the passive task. All of the following 
results in this subsection are based on using the 2 x 5 x 3 ANOVA outlined above 
but on different ERP components. 
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P1. Results indicated a significant interaction between gradient and race 
on the amplitude at electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4, F(4,188) = 3.10, p = .017, 
ηp2 = .062, see Figure 3. For White participants, there was an effect of gradient, 
F(4,140) = 3.06, p = .019, ηp2 = .080, but there no effect for Non-White 
participants F(4,64) = 1.52, p = .208, ηp2 = .087. Pairwise comparisons with a 
Bonferroni correction for White participants further revealed a significant 
difference between amplitudes for 0% Black (fully White) target faces (M = 0.76, 
SE = 2.08) and 100% Black target faces (M = 3.53, SE = 1.55), p = .048, where 
White participants had significantly greater neural attention to 100% Black 
compared to 100% White faces. There were no other significant effects on P1 
amplitude, all ps > .139. 
N170. Results indicated a marginally significant gradient by race 
interaction on N170, F(4,188) = 2.51, p = .043, ηp2 = .051, and a significant 
gradient by condition interaction, F(8,188) = 2.46, p = .015, ηp2 = .095; both were 
qualified by a significant three-way interaction, F(8,188) = 1.99, p = .050, ηp2 = 
.078, see Figures 4a-4c. A 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black, 
25% Black, 50% Black, 75% Black, 100% Black) mixed measures ANOVA was 
conducted after splitting the file for condition and revealed a significant race by 
gradient interaction for the control condition, F(4,76) = 2.67, p = .039, ηp2 = .123, 
and no significant interactions for either the biological, F(4,48) = 1.59, p = .192, 
ηp2 = .117, or social, F(4,64) = 1.51, p = .209, ηp2 = .086, conditions. After 
breaking down the control condition by race to look at the effect of gradient on 
amplitude there were no main effects of gradient after Bonferroni correction, all 
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ps > .296. 
P2. Results revealed a gradient by race interaction on P2 amplitude, 
F(4,188) = 3.42, p = .010, ηp2 = .068, which was qualified by a marginally 
significant three-way interaction, F(8,188) = 1.74, p = .091, ηp2 = .069, see 
Figures 5a – 5c. A 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black, 25% 
Black, 50% Black, 75% Black, 100% Black) mixed measures ANOVA was 
conducted after splitting the file for condition and revealed a marginally significant 
race by gradient interaction for the control condition, F(4,76) = 2.40, p = .057, ηp2 
= .112, a significant interaction for the biological condition, F(4,48) = 2.66, p = 
.044, ηp2 = .181, but no interaction for the social condition. After breaking down 
the control and biological conditions by race to look at the effect of gradient on 
amplitude there were no main effects of gradient after Bonferroni correction, all 
ps > .145. 
N2. Results indicated a marginal interaction of gradient and race on N2 
amplitude at electrode cluster Fz, F3, and F4, F(4,188) = 2.20, p = .071, ηp2 = 
.045, see Figure 6. However, pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections 
revealed no significant differences between any two gradients, all ps > .636. 
N3. Results indicated a marginal main effect of gradient on N3 amplitude 
at electrode cluster Cz, C3, and C4, F(4,188) = 2.34, p = .057, ηp2 = .047, see 
Figure 7. However, pairwise comparisons revealed no significant differences 
between any two gradients, all ps > .117. Additionally there was a significant 
interaction between gradient and race on N3 amplitude, F(4,188) = 3.10, p = 
.017, ηp2 = .062, see Figure 20. A repeated measures ANOVA of gradient split by 
 32 
 
participant race revealed a significant main effect of gradient on amplitude for 
White participants, F(4,140) = 2.73, p = .032, ηp2 = .072, and a marginally 
significant main effect for Non-White participants F(4,64) = 2.08, p = .094, ηp2 = 
.115. Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant differences after Bonferroni 
corrections, all ps > .272. 
P3. Results indicated a significant main effect of gradient on P3 amplitude 
at electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4, F(4,188) = 2.48, p = .046, ηp2 = .050. There 
was a gradient by race interaction on P3 amplitude, F(4,188) = 3.04, p = .019, ηp2 
= .061, see Figure 8. There was a significant main effect of gradient on amplitude 
for White participants, F(4,140) = 3.56, p = .008, ηp2 = .092 but no significant 
main effect for Non-White participants, F(4,64) = 1.79, p = .141, ηp2 = .101. 
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections revealed only a marginally 
significant difference between 0% Black and 25% Black target faces for White 
participants, p = .095 where participants had greater neural attention to 25% 
Black faces (M = 5.20, SE = 1.49) than to 0% Black faces (M = 1.74, SE = 1.78).  
Finally, there was a marginally significant main effect of condition on P3 
amplitude, F(2,47) = 2.44, p = .098, ηp2 = .094, see Figure 9. However, no 
pairwise comparisons were significant after a Bonferroni correction, all ps > .486. 
N4. There was a gradient by race interaction on the N4 amplitude at 
electrode cluster O1, O2, and Pz, F(4,188) = 2.69, p = .032, ηp2 = .054, a 
marginal gradient by condition interaction on N4, F(8,188) = 1.77, p = .086, ηp2 = 
.070, and a marginal race by condition interaction on N4, F(8,188) = 2.88, p = 
.066, ηp2 = .109. These effects were all qualified by a significant three-way 
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interaction, F(8,188) = 1.98, p = .051, ηp2 = .078, see Figures 10a-10c. A 2 
(Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black, 25% Black, 50% Black, 75% 
Black, 100% Black) mixed measures ANOVA was conducted after splitting the 
file for condition and revealed a marginally significant race by gradient interaction 
for the biological condition, F(4,48) = 2.27, p = .076, ηp2 = .159, a marginally 
significant interaction for the social condition, F(4,64) = 2.14, p = .086, ηp2 = .118, 
and a marginally significant interaction for the control condition, F(4,76) = 2.19, p 
= .078, ηp2 = .104. When examining the biological condition, there was a main 
effect of gradient on amplitude for White participants only, F(4,32) = 2.17, p = 
.096, ηp2 = .213. However, pairwise comparisons between the gradients after 
Bonferroni corrections revealed no significant differences, all ps > .494. There 
was also a main effect of gradient on amplitude for White participants in the 
social condition, F(4,40) = 3.22, p = .022, ηp2 = .244. However, pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections revealed no significant differences 
between gradients, all ps > .417. Finally, there was no main effect of gradient in 
the control condition, all ps > .177. 
LPP. Results indicated a significant main effect of gradient on LPP 
amplitude at electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4, F(4,188) = 2.49, p = .045, ηp2 = 
.050. There was a gradient by race interaction on LPP amplitude, F(4,188) = 
2.83, p = .026, ηp2 = .057, see Figure 11. There was a significant effect of 
gradient on amplitude for White participants, F(4,140) = 3.21, p = .015, ηp2 = .084 
but no significant main effect for Non-White participants F(4,64) = 1.66, p = .171, 
ηp2 = .094. Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant differences, all ps > 
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.176 after Bonferroni corrections. 
Perceiver Racial Categorization 
 In order to examine neural processing of faces as a function of 
participants’ categorization of the targets, ERPs were time-locked to the target 
presentation based on stimulus response. That is, different ERPs were created 
for each categorization for each participant and averaged across participants 
based on their response.  
Neural Attention by Categorization. A 4 (Categorization: White, Black, 
Mixed Race, Other Race) x 3 (Condition: Bio, Social, Control) x 2 (Race: White, 
Non-White) ANOVA was conducted in order to test hypothesis five to see how 
participants’ neural processing fluctuated based on their categorization of target 
faces. There was a 3-way interaction between categorization, condition, and 
participant race on neural processing of the N3 component, F(6,141) = 3.01, p = 
.008, ηp2 = .114, see Figures 12a-12c. A 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 4 
(Response: White, Black, Mixed, Other) mixed measures ANOVA was conducted 
after splitting the file for condition and revealed a significant interaction between 
response and participant race for the control condition, F(3,76) = 3.80, p = .015, 
ηp2 = .167, but no interaction for the biological condition, F(3,36) = .69, p = .56,  
ηp2 = .055, or social condition, F(3,48) = .11, p = .955, ηp2 = .007. After breaking 
down the control condition into race, there was no main effect of gradient on 
amplitude after Bonferroni corrections, all ps > .365. 
Discussion 
The goal of the current study was to investigate how an essentialism 
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manipulation influences implicit neural attention to multiracial and monoracial 
faces. We sought to expand on previous research that suggests that an 
essentialism manipulation impacts behavioral tasks (Ho et al., 2015; Williams & 
Eberhardt, 2008) by extending the research to include neural attention. We were 
similarly hoping to expand on studies involving the neural attention of racially 
ambiguous individuals which only a handful of studies have done (Dickter & 
Kittel, 2012; Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2006, 2008). Finally, we wanted to see how 
categorization of racially ambiguous individuals influences the neural processing 
of the participant, which has not yet been investigated.  
For our manipulation check (hypothesis 1), we found a 3-way race by 
condition by time interaction on essentialism scores. After breaking down this 
effect, the only significant effect found was that non-White participants in the 
social condition had higher post-test essentialism scores than pre-test 
essentialism scores, which is the opposite of the predicted effect. For the most 
part then, our findings did not suggest that the manipulation affected explicit 
essentialism except in the social condition for non-White participants. Thus, in 
the current study, reading the articles did not change participants’ essentialism 
scores. This finding was counter to research by Williams and Eberhardt (2008) 
and Ho, Roberts, and Gelman (2015) that successfully manipulated essentialism 
using the current paradigm. One difference between their study and ours was 
that theirs was conducted on U.S. adults on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and they 
were specifically looking at the number of “Black” categorizations when given the 
category options “Black”, “White”, or “Black/White Multiracial”. Because our study 
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was conducted more recently on college students at a liberal arts college, the 
manipulation may not have been strong enough to convince the students at the 
college. In fact, a couple students claimed to not believe the article due to what 
they had learned in a biology class. Although we excluded these participants in 
our analyses, there may have been additional students included with similar 
opinions who did not voice their concerns which may suggest why there was not 
an increase in amplitudes in the biological condition. Similarly, because these 
students were at a liberal arts college they may have already had more of a 
social constructivist view of race leading to more of a ceiling effect and therefore 
not changing their amplitudes much in the social condition. Although we 
specifically recruited students with higher essentialism scores, most students 
were mid-range in the essentialism scale. It could be that this manipulation may 
work better on people who were higher on the essentialism scale and we did not 
have the power in this study to look at this effect. Future research should 
examine this possibility. Additionally, Ho and colleagues (2015) mentioned that 
they morphed faces to be ambiguous but it was not clear whether they just 
morphed 50% Black/White targets or did more of a gradient which would be more 
similar to this study. Due to the lack of clarity, it is impossible to say for certain 
what was done but it is possible that the researchers only used 50% faces which 
people may more naturally categorize as “Black” given the alternatives. 
We did not find support for hypothesis one, which served as manipulation 
check and thus we were not successful in manipulating participants’ self-reported 
essentialism. However, our results revealed that in the passive task, reaction 
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times and several ERP components differed as a function of the essentialist 
manipulation, the gradient of the target faces, and the racial category of the 
participant. Thus, although not all of our hypotheses were supported by the data, 
our results suggest that some of the implicit responses and neural processing of 
faces of different levels of racial ambiguity was different based on participant 
race and essentialism condition. 
One of the most consistent findings in this study is the gradient by race 
interactions in the passive task in all ERP components (P1, N170, P2, N2, P3, 
N4, and LPP). The effects for the N170, P2, and N4 components were qualified 
by 3-way interactions and thus will be discussed below. However, the P1, N2, 
P3, and LPP components showed the race by gradient interactions regardless of 
condition. In the P1 component, White participants allocated more neural 
attention to Black target faces versus White target faces, suggesting more visual 
and attentional processing toward Blacks (Luck, 2005; Wiese et al., 2009), 
whereas non-White participants did not differ attention to target faces. 
Additionally, although not significant, both White and non-White participants had 
greatest attention to ambiguous faces in general as compared to monoracial 
faces.  
In the P3 and LPP components there was again an interaction and both 
revealed effects for White participants but not for non-White participants. The P3 
component could be further broken down and revealed greater attention to 25% 
Black target faces rather than White faces. The P3 component is thought to 
reflect novelty (Friedman, Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001) so target faces that are not 
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quite White but not very different from White may be novel to people being forced 
to examine race of these target faces for the first time, whereas in a real-life 
setting, people may not think about how a person looks only slightly different 
from them but still different enough. This supports hypodescent (Ho, Sidanius, 
Levin, & Banaji, 2011; Peery & Bodenhausen, 2008) or the ingroup overexclusion 
effect (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992).  
The results for the LPP component was different from previous studies 
that revealed greater attention toward racial ingroup faces than outgroup faces 
(Ito & Urland, 2003; Wiese et al., 2009) because although there were no further 
effects, the pattern suggests that White participants had greater attention toward 
outgroup faces than White faces. Because this is not significant, we will not 
speculate further.  
There was also an interaction between race and gradient in the N2 
component but no effects when broken down further. This contradicts one of the 
most consistent findings in ERP research with faces that the N2 component is 
larger to racial ingroup than outgroup faces (e.g., Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Ito 
& Urland, 2003, 2005). The N2 component is sensitive to social group 
membership so it is unclear why we did not find this effect. However, this passive 
task is very different from most of the studies that have found this effect. Some of 
the variations on procedures include a flanker task where multiple pictures are 
shown at once (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007), categorization tasks (e.g., Ito & 
Urland, 2003), context dependent or primed tasks (Ito & Urland, 2005; Willadsen-
Jensen & Ito, 2015) or tasks such as the oddball task where more pictures of one 
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racial category are shown with only a couple pictures from the other category (Ito 
& Urland, 2005). It may be then that showing one picture at a time that equally 
represent all categories shown but not requiring a response may lead to different 
neural attention. 
Among the most interesting effects was the 3-way interactions between 
condition, race, and gradient in the N170, P2, and N4 components in the passive 
task, suggesting that neural attention toward ambiguous and monoracial faces is 
processed differently for White and Non-White participants and further depends 
on whether participants were primed with either a biological view of race, a social 
view of race, or a control condition not mentioning race. We found a 3-way 
interaction in the N170 component and replicated previous studies which found 
that White participants more deeply visually process own-race rather than other-
race faces (Caldara et al., 2003; Herrmann et al., 2007; Ito & Urland, 2005; 
Walker, Silvert, Hewstone, & Nobre, 2008; Wiese et al., 2009). We extended on 
this by finding that non-White participants processed Black faces more deeply 
than any other gradient. It was also found that the greatest difference for gradient 
between White and non-White participants occurred in the control condition. This 
will be visited after discussing the 3-way interaction for component N4 which 
found similar effects. 
We also found a 3-way interaction in the P2 component. First, we 
replicated previous work with White participants allocating greater neural 
attention to Black/ambiguous faces than they did toward White faces (Dickter & 
Bartholow, 2007; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Kubota & Ito, 2007; Willadsen-Jensen 
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& Ito, 2006, 2008). Furthermore, for non-White participants, there was an 
interaction between race and gradient in both the biological and control 
conditions. This suggests greater neural attention by White participants to non-
White faces. Though these were not significant, White participants in the 
biological condition had greater neural attention to every group than 0% Black 
target faces than did non-White participants. In the control condition, White 
participants allocated more attention toward all target groups than did non-White 
participants, though this was not significant. In the social condition, White and 
non-White participants allocated similar attention toward all ambiguous targets.  
Interestingly, we found a 3-way interaction for the N4 component where 
there were effects of race and gradient for all conditions. Upon breaking this 
down further, there was an effect of gradient for White participants in the 
biological and social condition. Traditionally, the N4 component has been used 
as a measure of semantic processing to words or pictures (see Katas & 
Federmeier, 2011, for a review), and amplitudes are usually larger in response to 
greater incongruence. For instance, Kutas and Hillyard (1980) found that 
participants had greater N4 amplitudes toward the sentence “He took a sip from 
the transmitter” which was strongly incongruent with “He took a sip from the 
water fountain” (pg. 203). Research has shown similar amplitude differences in 
the N4 component based on how semantically incongruent sentences or words 
and pictures are (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000). We could not find any studies 
linking the N4 component to perceivers looking at target faces, either race or 
otherwise. In the current study, the incongruence may have something to do with 
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this task. The N4 race by gradient interaction was significant only in the social 
and biological conditions. Though there was no significance when broken down 
further, the general pattern suggests larger amplitudes for ingroup faces for both 
Whites and non-Whites. It may be that reading articles suggesting extremes of 
race being either biological or socially constructed led viewers to process “own-
race” faces more deeply due to the incongruence about what they thought they 
knew about their own race and what they had just been told. However, because 
no other studies have found similar effects (even after semantic priming that 
would theoretically lead to greater incongruence), this should be interpreted with 
caution and further research should attempt to replicate this effect.  
Interestingly, Non-White participants who are not primed with race 
allocated greatest attention for 100% Black faces in both the N170 and N4 
components.  We found no research that included participants who were not one 
of the target groups that were being tested (e.g., no research included Asian 
participants when looking at Black and White multiracial faces). Our Non-White 
participants showed greater amplitudes toward 100% Black target faces in the 
N170 and N4 components which has typically been found to have highest 
amplitude in own race faces (e.g., Caldara et al., 2003; Herrmann et al., 2007; Ito 
& Urland, 2005). This may be due to the fact that in the biological and social 
condition participants were primed with race, but the article talked specifically 
about identifying between Black and White individuals. In the control condition, 
where the participants were not primed with race, Non-White participants may 
have identified more with targets of color rather than White targets leading them 
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to show similar effects to Black participants in other studies (Tajfel, 1979). This 
identification may be due to the overexclusion effect (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992) or 
the experiences/ethnic identification of minorities in the U.S. due to institutional 
racism in the U.S. (e.g., Lopez, 2000). Therefore, priming race as White and 
Black in the articles may have led non-Black, non-White participants to not 
identify with either race and instead with their own race which was not 
represented by target pictures. While these are interesting effects it is important 
to note that after splitting participants into White and Non-White groups our 
sample size per group was rather small. Additionally, grouping multiple different 
races into a non-White category is not ideal as each racial category has their own 
unique experiences and perceptions (e.g., Agiesta, 2015). However, previous 
research suggests that some outgroups identify as minorities over their own 
racial group when compared to Whites (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2012) so we 
thought it would be interesting to include. 
There was a significant race by gradient interaction on participants’ 
reaction times as well. As expected, all participants were generally slower to 
categorize ambiguous faces than they were monoracial faces. This is similar to 
previous research that have found this effect (e.g., Levin, 2000; Peery & 
Bodenhausen, 2008; Stroessner, 1996). However, White participants were faster 
to categorize fully White targets than any other groups whereas non-White 
participants were fastest to categorize fully White target faces than most other 
groups but not faster than categorizing fully Black faces. These results were 
surprising because although our hypothesis held, it would also make sense for 
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White participants to be faster at categorizing 100% Black target faces than the 
ambiguous race target faces. In most studies involving the categorization of 
multiracial individuals, participants are generally given more time (e.g., Peery & 
Bodenhausen, 2008). It may be that because in our study, participants did not 
have much time to categorize, and because the faces were on a gradient 
(meaning that the 0% and 25% Black faces would not differ much from each 
other and the 25% and 50% Black faces would not differ much, and so on) White 
participants erred on the side of caution based on the ingroup overexclusion 
effect (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992) and therefore wanted to make sure they were 
not accidentally adding outgroups to their ingroup, so they took longer to 
categorize ambiguous faces. 
The final interesting finding is that there was a 3-way interaction (race by 
condition by response race) on hypothesis five that participants’ neural 
processing would change based on their categorization of target faces. Further 
breakdowns revealed only a race by response interaction for the control 
condition. Although no responses were significantly different after breaking down 
further, the patterns suggests that White participants did not differ much in neural 
attention based on category chosen but that non-White participants had greater 
neural attention to “Other Race” faces than other groups. We expected 
participants to have greater neural attention toward faces they categorized as 
“Other Race” than “Mixed Race” because they are different in terms of 
essentialist views in terms of race being biological, immutable, and discrete. 
Seeing an ambiguous race person and identifying them as “Mixed Race” 
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suggests that the perceiver at least views race as not entirely discrete whereas 
identifying the target as “Other Race” defies the notion of race in a spectrum and 
suggests instead that it is discrete. Therefore, it is not surprising that non-White 
participants showed greater attention toward “Other Race” faces. What is 
surprising is that White participants did not show this effect and that this occurred 
in the N3 component. The N3 component has often been linked to either 
unexpected stimuli (Lai & Mangels, 2007) or incongruent pairings such as 
incongruent word-picture pairs (Barrett and Rugg, 1990; Mazerolle et al., 2007; 
Sitnikova et al., 2008). It may be that non-White participants who categorized 
ambiguous faces as “Other Race” found the target picture as “unexpected” such 
that perhaps they didn’t plan to use many “Other Race” labels but truly could not 
consolidate the target faces as “Black”, “White”, or “Mixed Race” in their minds 
therefore making the stimuli both “unexpected” and perhaps “incongruent” with 
results. Similar to the findings for the N4 component, this component was 
included because it was identified in the software as a clear component 
according to the amplitude and it has not been shown in other face perception 
research. Therefore, future researchers should try to replicate this effect. 
As mentioned above, many factors including the small group sizes, 
including all Non-White participants into the same category, and recruiting 
college students whose means were mid to low range on the essentialism scale 
could have affected these results. However, we did find effects including between 
the target gradient race and participant race. Future studies should try to 
replicate and extend our findings for multiracial target faces and should include 
 45 
 
Black participants as well as White. Also, while grouping non-White participants 
into a single category was not ideal, some of our results suggest that the non-
White participants in our sample show more similar results to Black participants 
in other studies than to White participants in our study or other studies (Dickter & 
Bartholow, 2007; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Kubota & Ito, 2007; Willadsen-Jensen 
& Ito, 2006, 2008), especially those in the control condition. This may suggest 
that certain racial groups identify more with Blacks than White and may consider 
in-groups differently with a lack of option for their own race. For instance, racial 
minorities in the U.S. may think on terms of “us” (i.e., racial minorities) versus 
“them” (i.e., White) instead on traditional racial ingroups and outgroups. 
The findings of this study suggest that the neural processing of racially 
ambiguous individuals is affected potentially by essentialist beliefs but also 
participant race. This is important because it suggests that the automatic 
responses one has to a target may guide perceivers’ beliefs, feelings, and social 
behavior toward multiracial individuals (Brewer, 1998; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004). Because the multiracial population in the 
U.S. is expanding (Gathier, 2015) it is important that we continue looking at 
perception of multiracial individuals and continue to attempt to figure out ways to 
reduce attentional bias toward multiracial individuals. 
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Figures 1a-1c. Marginally significant three way interaction between race, 
condition, and time on essentialism scores. 
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Figure 2. Three way interaction between race, gradient, and condition on 
participant reaction times during categorization task.  
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Figure 3. Significant race by gradient interaction at component P1. After breaking 
down race, there was a main effect of gradient for White participants. 
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Figures 4a-4c. Three-way interaction of race, gradient, and condition on N170 
amplitude during the passive task. 
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Figure 5. Three-way interaction of race, gradient, and condition on P2 amplitude 
during the passive task. 
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Figure 6. Race by gradient interaction on the amplitude of the N2 component. 
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Figure 7. Gradient by race interaction for N3 amplitude. 
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Figure 8. Gradient by race interaction for P3 amplitude with a significant main 
effect of gradient for White participants. 
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Figure 9. Main effect of condition on P3 amplitude during the passive task. 
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Figures 10a-10c. Three way interaction between race, condition, and gradient for 
N4 amplitude. Significant race by gradient interactions in all conditions. Main 
effect for White participants in the social and biological conditions. 
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Figure 11. Race by gradient interaction on LPP amplitude. Main effect of gradient 
for White participants. 
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Figures 12a – 12c. Three way interaction between race, condition, and chosen 
racial response for N3 amplitude during the categorization task. There was a 
significant interaction between race and gradient for the control condition. 
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Table 1  
Participant Characteristics 
Characteristic Biological (n = 14) Social (n = 18) Control (n = 21) Test Statistic 
Age (years) 18.92 ± .30 19.17 ± .25 19.29 ± .23 F(2,52) = 0.47, p = .630 
Gender (% female) 31% 50% 52% χ2(1) = 1.67, p = .43 
Race (% Caucasian) 64% 61% 76% χ2(2) = 1.13, p = .57 
RCS (Time 1) 4.32 ± .24 4.02 ± .18 4.13 ± .18 F(2,47) = 0.50, p = .610 
ATB (Time 1) 6.15 ± .22 5.75 ± .17 5.91 ± .17 F(2,47) = 1.06, p = .354 
Familiarity Blacks (%) 6.9%  ± 2.6% 8.4%  ± 2.2% 8.2%  ± 2.0% F(2,52) = .12, p = .892 
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Appendix A 
Target Faces Examples (Top = 0% Black to Bottom = 100% Black) 
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Appendix B 
Race Conceptions Scale 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
If a Black American 
family traveled 
around the world, 
people they met 
would probably think 
of them as Black too. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The physical 
features of different 
racial groups haven't 
really changed much 
over the centuries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The same racial 
categories have 
pretty much always 
existed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It's impossible to 
determine how a 
person will be 
racially categorized 
by examining their 
DNA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No one can change 
his or her race - you 
are who you are. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If a White American 
family traveled 
around the world, 
people they met 
would probably think 
of them as White 
too. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It's natural to notice 
the racial group to 
which people 
belong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I believe that 
physical features 
determine race. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generally speaking, 
two Black people will 
always look more 
similar to each other 
than a Black person 
and a White person 
ever would. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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How a person is 
defined racially 
depends on the 
social context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Siblings born to the 
same parents will 
always be of the 
same race as each 
other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Young children 
probably learn about 
which people fall into 
which racial groups 
automatically, 
without much help 
from adults. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A person's race is 
fixed at birth. 
 
       
The political climate 
can dictate whether 
someone is 
categorized as Black 
or White. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 200 years, society 
will use basically the 
same racial 
categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There's agreement 
across cultures 
about which racial 
groups people fall 
into. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The average person 
is highly accurate at 
identifying people by 
race. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People who are of 
different races may 
look quite similar to 
each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Racial categories 
haven't always 
existed in the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It's easy to tell what 
race people are by 
looking at them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Racial groups are 
primarily determined 
by biology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 81 
 
It's possible to be a 
full member of more 
than one race. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Appendix C 
Attitudes Toward Blacks Scale 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
I enjoy a funny racial 
joke, even if some 
people might find it 
offensive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If I had a chance to 
introduce Black 
visitors to my friends 
and neighbors, I 
would be pleased to 
do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I would rather not 
have Blacks live in 
the same apartment 
building I live in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Racial integration (of 
schools, businesses, 
residences, etc.) has 
benefited both 
Whites and Blacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I probably would feel 
somewhat self-
conscious dancing 
with a Black in a 
public place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I think that Black 
people look more 
similar to each other 
than White people 
do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It would not bother 
me if my new 
roommate was 
Black. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inter-racial marriage 
should be 
discouraged to avoid 
the "who-am-I?" 
confusion which the 
children feel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If a Black were put in 
charge of me, I 
would not mind 
taking advice and 
direction from him or 
her. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Generally, Blacks 
are not as smart as 
Whites. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The federal 
government should 
take decisive steps 
to override the 
injustices Blacks 
suffer at the hands 
of local authorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is likely that Blacks 
will bring violence to 
neighborhoods when 
they move in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Black and White 
people are inherently 
equal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I get very upset 
when I hear a White 
make a prejudicial 
remark about 
Blacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I worry that in the 
next few years I may 
be denied my 
application for a job 
or a promotion 
because of 
preferential 
treatment given to 
minority group 
members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I favor open housing 
laws that allow for 
more racial 
integration of 
neighborhoods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Black people are 
demanding too much 
too fast in their push 
for equal rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I would not mind at 
all if a Black family 
with about the same 
income and 
education as me 
moved in next door. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whites should 
support Blacks in 
their struggle against 
discrimination and 
segregation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Some Blacks are so 
touchy about race 
that it is difficult to 
get along with them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Appendix D 
Articles Science News 
  
 
B I O L O G Y  
 
 
Scientists Pinpoint Genetic Underpinnings of Race 
 
CHARLOTTESVILLE – Scientists working 
on mapping the origins of life through the 
Human Genome Project have uncovered some 
genetic codes that they believe can be used as 
indicators of racial background. 
“Up till now, [we] weren’t able to determine 
a person’s race based just on DNA,” said 
Robert Kaminsky, a University of Virginia 
scientist and lead author of the study, which 
was just released in the prestigious journal 
Gene. “But now we’re able to use some of the 
genetic cues to skin color and other physical 
features to guess at what a person may look 
like, based on a very small genetic sample.” 
Dr. Kaminsky and a graduate student, Lisa 
Faridany, along with colleague Anthony 
Schmidt of the Georgetown Medical Center 
have been working for several years on 
mapping the genotypic expressions involved in 
skin color and other phenotypic physical 
features. They have focused particularly on the 
melanocortin 1 receptor (MCR1) gene, which is 
implicated most powerfully in skin color. The 
present study explores the link between this 
gene and the phenylalanine hydroxylase 
protein, which is involved in melanin production, 
in varying amounts for different racial groups. 
The researchers used skin, blood, and other 
tissue samples from hospital patients whose 
race was indicated in their charts, but was kept 
hidden from lab members until the genetic 
analyses were complete. 
“We found that once we had a good idea of  
where the genetic components to some of 
these key physical features were located, we 
were able to correctly guess the patients’ racial 
backgrounds 69% of the time, which is well 
above chance rate,” Dr. Kaminsky said. “And 
with Black and White patients in particular, our 
success rates were even higher.” 
Their results add to the growing body of 
evidence that so much of who we are as people 
can be traced to our genetic origins – including 
race. 
“This doesn’t mean that there aren’t 
environmental influences on race, just like 
everything else,” Dr. Kaminsky cautioned. “But 
in the end, we obtain our genetic material from 
our parents, so we generally inherit their race 
along with everything else.” 
He pointed to evolutionary theories as to 
why humans might have evolved to have 
different physical appearances. For example, 
the melanin that produces a dark skin color 
among people of African heritage may have 
served as a life-saving protection against strong 
sun exposure, he said. And among people 
living in what is now Northern Europe, their 
relatively lesser access to sunlight was aided by 
fairer skin, which allows for greater absorption 
of Vitamin D. 
Dr. Kaminsky and his colleagues are 
continuing their contribution to the Human 
Genome Project with current work on the 
genetic underpinnings of depression and other 
mood disorders. 
 
 
Link me to more news about: 
 
 Macromolecules   Immunology    Cell 
Biology 
 
Science News Subscription Information 
 
http://www.sciencenews.com/cuttingedge/bio/17jan2017.html 
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Science News  
 
B I O L O G Y  
 
 
Scientists Reveal That Race Has No Genetic Basis 
 
CHARLOTTESVILLE – Scientists working 
on mapping the origins of life through the 
Human Genome Project have definitively 
demonstrated that no genetic codes can be tied 
to racial background. 
“Up till now, there was a big question [in the 
scientific community] about whether we could 
determine a person’s race based just on DNA,” 
says Robert Kaminsky, a University of Virginia 
scientist and lead author of the study, which 
was just released in the prestigious journal 
Gene. “But now we know the answer – there 
are no genetic markers that indicate what racial 
group a person belongs to.” 
Dr. Kaminsky and a graduate student, Lisa 
Faridany, along with colleague Anthony 
Schmidt of the Georgetown Medical Center, 
have been working for several years on 
mapping the genotypic expressions involved in 
skin color and other phenotypic physical 
features. They have focused particularly on the 
melanocortin 1 receptor (MCR1) gene, which is 
implicated most powerfully in skin color. The 
present study explores the link between this 
gene and the phenylalanine hydroxylase 
protein, which is involved in melanin production, 
in varying amounts for different people. 
The researchers used skin, blood, and other 
tissue samples from hospital patients whose 
race was indicated in their charts, but was kept 
hidden from lab members until the genetic 
analyses were complete. 
“We found that even when we had a good 
idea of where the genetic components to some 
of these key physical features were located, we 
were able to correctly guess the patients’ racial 
backgrounds only 27% of the time, which is 
really no better than chance rate,” Dr. Kaminsky 
said. “There’s just no one cue or set of cues 
that indicates, say, whether someone is Black 
or White.” 
Their results add to the growing body of 
evidence that although genes do play an 
important role in who we are, social and 
environmental factors may in many 
circumstances be even more powerful. 
“This doesn’t mean that there aren’t 
hereditary components to physical 
appearance,” Dr. Kaminsky cautioned. “We do 
inherit our physical appearance from our 
parents, but the practice of classifying people 
into different racial groups based on certain 
patterns of physical appearance is entirely 
cultural in origin. There’s just no genetic basis 
for it.” 
He pointed to evidence that each racial 
group has more variability within the group in 
any given physical dimension, such as skin 
color, than exists between any two groups. He 
also added that racial classification is a 
relatively recent development in human history 
– even though people’s physical appearances 
have been relatively stable over time, the 
categories into which people are classified 
change constantly according to the political 
climate. 
Dr. Kaminsky and his colleagues are 
continuing their contribution to the Human 
Genome Project with current work on the 
genetic underpinnings of depression and other 
mood disorders. 
 
Link me to more news about: 
 
 Macromolecules   Immunology    Cell Biology 
 
Science News Subscription Information http://www.sciencenews.com/cuttingedge/bio/17jan2017.html 
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Science News 
 
 
A S T R O N O M Y  
 
 
Scientists Discover Galaxy with Gas Halo 
 
CHARLOTTESVILLE – Astronomers 
working to understand the many mysteries of 
the universe have now discovered how galaxies 
provide the fuel for star formation. 
“Up till now, there was a big question [in 
astronomy] about galaxies and how they found 
the fuel to create billions of stars even after they 
have already formed,” says Robert Kaminsky, 
an astronomer at the University of Virginia and 
lead author of the study, which was just 
released in the prestigious journal Astronomy. 
“But now we know the answer – the galaxy’s 
immense gravity attracts gas, creating the 
spherical halo and providing the fuel for star 
formation.” 
Dr. Kaminsky and a graduate student, Lisa 
Faridany, along with colleague Anthony Sanford 
at Cambridge University, have been working for 
several years studying distant galaxies and 
their different features. They have focused 
particularly on galaxy formation, uncovering the 
different ways that galaxies may form and how 
they interact with other objects and particles. 
The present study now explores these recently 
discovered gas clouds to investigate any other 
links that they may provide to galaxy formation. 
The researchers used NASA’s Chandra X-
ray Observatory to view the spherical gas halo 
that was found centered on the nucleus of NGC 
5746, a spiral galaxy like our own Milky Way. 
The halo has a radius of about 60,000 light 
years but is not visible in optical wavelengths.  
“We are likely witnessing here the ongoing 
galaxy formation process,” Dr. Kaminsky said. 
“We did not detect this halo until recently 
because NGC 5746 is a quiet galaxy compared 
to our own Milky Way. It displays no unusual 
star formation or energetic activity from its 
central region. This led us to realize that the 
gas is not being ejected out of the galaxy, but 
being attracted into it.” 
Their results add to the growing body of 
evidence that galaxies can be shaped by the 
activity of massive black holes in the centers, 
causing gas particles to gravitate toward it. 
“This doesn’t mean that there aren’t other 
ways that galaxies obtain their fuel for star 
formation,” Dr. Kaminsky cautioned. “We are 
hoping to find alternative processes that also 
explain galaxy formation. We’re also examining 
the theory that galaxies can grow by 
cannibalizing other galaxies.” 
The finding of gas halos supports computer 
simulations that show galaxies building up 
gradually from the merger of small hot clouds of 
intergalactic matter. According to this theory, 
the gas halos covering the galaxies should be 
detectable, but scientists were unsuccessful 
detecting these halos until now with the help of 
advancements in X-ray technology. 
Dr. Kaminsky and his colleagues are 
continuing their exploration into galaxy 
formation and hope to discover other gas halos 
that support their findings. 
 
 
Link me to more news about: 
 
 Galaxy Formation   Black Holes    Astronomy 
 
Science News Subscription Information 
 
http://www.sciencenews.com/cuttingedge/astro/17jan2017.html 
 
